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Abstract: In any proposal for specicide, as represented by mosquito eradication, one must acknowledge
that this involves a complex set of moral trade-offs. Taking it as given that the health burden of vector-
borne diseases has to be reduced drastically, this chapter lays out the landscape of normative arguments
that can be brought in the mosquito’s defence. These, in turn, should be involved in deliberations about
whether such large-scale eradication practices can be morally justified. In favour of mosquito protection,
several (but not exhaustive) kinds of arguments are presented based on individual mosquito’s moral
standing, the value of each species, concerns about hubris and risks, and questions about preferable
alternatives. At the same time, this chapter also inquires whether the conflict between humans and
mosquitos can be framed as a matter of self-defence—attributing to humans a right to defend themselves.
A morally important distinction here is that the mosquito is merely instrumentalized by the disease that
it carries which is the real motive of self-defence, showing that mosquitos are innocent in several senses
of the term. Taking all these different moral considerations seriously leaves us with an awareness that
the eradication of these species cannot be treated lightly
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Who has not swatted at least one mosquito? Surely most people have crushed 
at least one mosquito on a hot summer evening and did not think that there 
could be anything morally wrong about stopping that nuisance. After all, 
diseases transmitted by mosquitoes are a major global health issue: malaria, 
dengue fever and Zika—to name a few—are diseases transmitted by mosquitoes, 
with substantial impact on the well-being of a large part of the world’s human 
population. Some mosquito-borne diseases such as the West Nile virus are 
hosted by other animals before being spread to humans (that is, they are zoonotic 
diseases, like the 2020 coronavirus pandemic), thereby situating this global health 
problem in a web of interspecies entanglements. To address this proliferating 
problem, drastic means might be considered necessary, such as eradication, 
bringing to extinction an entire mosquito species that transmits diseases, or at 
least drastically diminishing their populations. Can such large-scale eradication 
practices be morally justified?
That is the question that I will focus on in this chapter with a specific focus on 
the eradication of entire vector species which is a broader aim than the elimina-
tion or control of a few populations of that species. Instead of providing arguments 
from within public health ethics on the problem of mosquito-borne diseases, this 
chapter rather looks through an environmental ethics lens to illustrate what can 
be said to plead the mosquito’s case. The upshot in this “mosquito debate” is that 
we must acknowledge that in case of eradication something of moral relevance 
would be lost, even if we have good reasons to advocate such drastic methods: 
namely, mosquitoes matter. This chapter does not attempt a definitive answer 
or recommendation for action, but instead lays out the landscape of potential 
normative arguments. Importantly, the problem-framing inf luences what we 
perceive as morally salient features of a situation. If mosquito-borne diseases 
are considered to be borne out of a conf lict of interests between humans and 
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mosquitoes, then it needs to be kept in mind that the mosquitoes are “innocent” 
in several senses of the term as discussed later.
Environmental ethics is a field within moral philosophy that considers 
questions such as whether nature has a value that is independent of its usefulness 
to humans; or whether animals can be considered to be holders of moral rights. 
It is useful to brief ly engage with some arguments from this literature in order 
to provide a picture as inclusive as possible, covering a range of issues that 
are relevant to environmental moral theorizing. Moreover, this picture is not 
complete, since I look at the problem only from a Western analytical philosophy 
perspective. Introducing arguments in favour of the mosquito does not mean 
that there are no good counterarguments and other considerations that might 
outweigh the mosquito’s case. As we will see, also from an environmental ethics 
perspective, it is not always easy to justify the strong discomfort some may feel 
about different mosquito eradication proposals.
Of course, a full assessment of the mosquito problem would need much more 
detailed analysis than can be provided here, and many more nuanced questions 
regarding less drastic means than complete vector species eradication need to be 
asked, such as disease control by insecticide treated bed nets (ITN), or regarding 
the different means of disease eradication, in general, and the eradication of 
mosquito species, in particular. The discussion will rather remain at quite an 
abstract level. Regarding the elimination of mosquito populations in a specific 
area, for example, one could ask whether certain practices (such as spraying 
large areas with biological or non-biological agents) are morally preferable or 
inferior to other options (such as releasing genetically altered mosquitoes into 
an ecosystem) in addition to questions about feasibility, even if we would reach 
the conclusion that eradication of disease-carrying mosquito species was all-
things-considered necessary. While the elimination or reduction of mosquito 
populations does not have to add up to species eradication and therefore these 
constitute distinct aims, it is also the case that different means of eradication or 
elimination need to be distinguished regarding whether they have broad adverse 
effects or constitutes means of “target killing” the vector species in question.
Three preliminary points can be made. First, the following considerations 
are based on the assumption that complete eradication of certain mosquito 
species might be possible in the near future (despite not being possible at the 
moment), leaving aside the question regarding which interventions this would 
entail. Second, eradication is the focus here as it constitutes the most “extreme” 
form of disease-control from the mosquito’s perspective—although most of what 
follows is also applicable to deliberations about population control as well. Third, 
although a nuanced analysis would distinguish between reducing the disease 
burden and eliminating it completely, we shall simply assume that there are 
strong normative prerogatives for both of these goals.
The following discussion is divided into five sections. The first section sketches 
the broader “moral landscape” of the mosquito eradication and control question 
to identify a few important considerations that go beyond environmental ethics, 
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narrowly conceived. The second section shows how the lives of mosquitoes 
matter morally in themselves or as members of a species, while the third section 
discusses how the lives of mosquitoes might matter also indirectly in our moral 
deliberations. The fourth section is dedicated to the subject of how eradicating 
mosquito species constitutes a form of self-defence and whether this might 
constitute an appropriate framing of the disease-carrying mosquito conf lict, 
with the last section summarizing the main points and offering some concluding 
remarks.
The moral landscape
The environmental ethics questions considered here are situated in the broader 
discourse of moral philosophy which includes other fields with important con-
tributions to the issue of mosquito eradication, especially political philosophy 
and bioethics. Here there are four (not exhaustive) general issues that stand out.
For one, mosquito eradication and control require us to think about legitimacy. 
That is, who should decide about such interventions? In essence, this issue 
revolves around informed consent and political legitimacy. Matters of informed 
consent, as discussed in bioethics, account for the need of patients making 
voluntary decisions about their own medical treatment in clinical practice and 
medical research (see Manson and O’Neill 2007). Yet in this context it is more 
apt to speak of “group consent” (see Deplazes-Zemp 2018). Thus, field trials 
and other interventions on mosquitoes require the informed consent—or rather 
authorization via appropriate procedures—of the affected human communities in 
order to gain legitimacy (Meghani and Boëte 2018, Neuhaus and Caplan 2017), 
which leads also to the political dimension of legitimacy. Mosquito eradication 
projects are large-scale enterprises with effects that can transcend spatial and 
temporal borders to affect distant communities and future generations, involving 
inputs from national and international governmental and non-governmental 
agencies. This generates questions of political legitimacy (which is a contested 
area of debate) in terms of, for instance, the democratic authorization required 
to justify political power (see Buchanan 2002).
There is a second issue of risk, and the way it is embodied by different 
interventions which I will consider brief ly in the third section. A complicated 
subject, risk is integral to any eradication and control proposal according to 
methods, aims and potential kinds of risks involved. It is precisely due to such 
risks that questions of legitimacy become especially salient.
A third issue that arises regards questions of distributive justice, since the burden 
of mosquito-borne diseases particularly affects the poor which, in turn, is linked 
to the uneven capacities of health services and relevant infrastructure (Greisman 
et al. 2019). There are also often special risks for pregnant women and children 
who catch a mosquito-borne disease. Such an unequal global distribution of the 
burden of disease can possibly be exacerbated by other inf luences such as climate 
change (WHO 2017). Accordingly, a global health justice lens then introduces a 
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range of questions about such issues as the fair distribution of costs of and access 
to interventions, and duties to aid the most affected. Moreover, the interactions 
between different dimensions of injustice—economic, health-related and envi-
ronmental—need to be kept in view.
Finally, and as the fourth issue, insofar as steering and monitoring people’s 
behaviour constitute important elements of an eradication strategy, then we must 
be sensitive to questions about how they interfere with people’s autonomy and right 
to privacy (Greisman et al. 2019). In light of these issues, we must acknowledge 
that the eradication of certain mosquito species would be of significant benefit 
(at least in the short term) to many people living in areas where mosquitoes 
are endemic. The dramatic impact mosquito-borne diseases have on the lives 
of many humans constitutes the main—and weighty—reason for eradication 
due to the fundamental interests to life and health at stake. Since several other 
chapters in this volume are already dedicated to the human dimensions of this 
ethical problem, we shall turn to other issues. As a consequence, we need to 
differentiate between what would be all-things-considered justified and what 
would be justified from the incomplete environment ethics perspective that I am 
presenting here.
Why mosquitoes matter
The question of whether we should eradicate disease-carrying mosquitoes is a 
significant challenge for many environmental ethicists who are committed to 
biological conservation aims. Many ethicists will not be satisfied with simply dis-
missing the mosquito’s place in the ecosystem as a “romantic notion” (compare, 
for instance, Fang 2010: 434). Moreover, amongst these are also ethicists with 
biocentric or ecocentric commitments who argue there are many more morally 
relevant attributes in nature than just sentience (such as in terms of the capacity 
to suffer pain). So, they will not be impressed by the possibility of a pain-free 
“specicide” (compare, for instance, Judson and Pugh in Bates 2016, and, in more 
detail, Pugh 2016). In the end, any comprehensive answer to the question about 
whether we should eradicate disease-carrying mosquitoes will involve a complex 
set of moral trade-offs. In favour of the protection of the mosquitoes in question, 
a combination of four different (but not exhaustive) kinds of arguments could 
be presented based on (1) caring about each individual mosquito, (2) the value 
of each species, (3) what eradication says about our moral character and (4) whether 
the potential benefits outweigh the risks of interventions. I address each of these 
issues in turn, starting with the first two in this section.
The moral considerability of each individual mosquito
As biocentrists will argue, focusing on sentience alone oversimplifies the 
moral landscape, because all living beings matter morally in themselves. That 
means that the life of each individual mosquito is morally considerable and 
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must be accounted for in our moral deliberations. As Paul Taylor phrased it, 
“[t]he biocentric outlook on nature … includes a certain way of perceiving and 
understanding each individual organism. Each is seen to be a teleological (goal-
oriented) centre of life, pursuing its own good in its own unique way” (Taylor 
1986: 44–45). From this perspective each individual mosquito matters in itself 
independent of whether humans consider it useful, harmful or beautiful.
This theoretical commitment entails that the well-being of even such 
dangerous creatures as Aedes aegypti must be acknowledged and integrated 
into our moral deliberations. Although this is the necessary conclusion of any 
biocentric position, it is also of course a contested idea. Putting it very crudely, 
critics who argue that this goes too far usually maintain that either only humans 
are morally considerable (Kant 1997, 1998) or else that non-human beings also 
have moral standing, but only if they exhibit some basic capacities such as in 
terms of awareness or an ability to suffer pain (Singer 1975, Regan 1984). Both 
perspectives exclude mosquitoes from the moral realm as beings that matter in 
themselves as—based on present knowledge—it is unlikely that they feel pain, 
for instance.
In contrast, others might counter that it seems convincing to attribute moral 
standing to individual mosquitoes—and that they therefore deserve considera-
tion in eradication programs—but accounting for that standing would be so 
demanding on our actions that we should exclude them from our moral consid-
erations nevertheless. Besides that such considerations feed into issues we will 
look at in the following sections, it is important to point out that being a holder 
of moral status (in terms of being morally considerable) is not enough to explain 
the full moral context that needs to be taken into account, and so does not suffi-
ciently explain what we should and should not do. Living beings matter in them-
selves, but what is ultimately morally justifiable also depends on the contextual 
and relational features of the situation. If a biocentrist would be committed to 
declaring that harm ought not be inf licted on any being with moral status under 
any circumstances, this would not constitute a viable position. We can refuse to 
pick a specific f lower in a field or to kill a specific spider in our living room, but 
we eat plants; insects die on our windshields. And beyond contextual and rela-
tional considerations (which always matter but on which theories diverge), dif-
ferent theories also provide different accounts of the relative weight of the moral 
status of a mosquito compared to that of other beings with moral status —if they 
deem mosquitoes morally considerable at all. Broadly speaking, the options are 
between egalitarian accounts, where all beings (but not all kinds of interests) 
matter exactly the same (Taylor 1986), and hierarchical accounts, where mos-
quitoes have less moral significance than, for example, sentient animals (Agar 
2001), or else non-hierarchical accounts, in which the moral significance of dif-
ferent living beings is incommensurable which strongly emphasizes contextual 
and relational considerations (Wienhues 2020).
Even if moral standing is insufficient for safeguarding all mosquitoes even 
in situations that do not involve substantial public health considerations, the 
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minimum that this requires of us is to consider whether there are alternative 
means that are as good from a public health perspective that do not require such 
drastic actions that might harm such a large number of mosquitoes. Alternatives 
to mosquito eradication include, for example, vaccines, the reduction of mos-
quito breeding grounds or the improvement of healthcare and sanitary facilities 
which might create considerable public health benefits. If individual mosquitoes 
are morally considerable, then we have an additional reason for seriously con-
sidering disease-control interventions that cause less harm to mosquitoes than 
eradication campaigns might do.1
The moral value of each mosquito species
Besides the moral status and related inherent worth of an individual mosquito, 
we may also attach some kind of moral value to each mosquito species (which, in 
turn, is related to considerations about biodiversity) which is particularly relevant 
if we speak about species eradication. The instrumental value of a species refers 
to its current or potential usefulness for humans, for example in terms of what 
some call “ecosystem services.”2 Whether certain mosquito species have such 
instrumental value depends ultimately on empirical evidence about, for instance, 
their role in various ecosystems, and whether ecosystems could perform these 
functions if the species were removed. However, can a mosquito species also be 
conceived as non-instrumentally valuable?
Some think that this is the case. From such a perspective each disease-carrying 
mosquito species can indeed be attributed value that goes beyond its instrumental 
value, if it has any. Yet, there is a range of different positions that can be taken on 
this matter. Amongst other things, one’s position on the value of species depends, 
on the one side, on what position on values one takes (such as debates between 
objective and subjective value accounts) and on the other side, on one’s position 
regarding what constitutes a species (such as the debates about the ontological 
status of species).3
For example, a fairly common claim is that species hold some form of objective 
“natural historical” value (Rolston 1995, but compare Sandler 2012), which is 
a type of non-instrumental value.4 Holmes Rolston III develops a bold version 
of the idea of natural historical value, arguing that each extinction is a kind 
of “superkilling” (1995: 523) because “a biological species is not just a class. A 
species is a living historical form … propagated in individual organisms, that 
f lows dynamically over generations” (1985: 721). Such reasoning suggests that 
the human-caused loss of a species and its associated natural historical value 
is morally problematic and given that this constitutes an “objective” value it 
is independent from peoples’ preferences. Here, people are not required to 
personally care about mosquitoes for them to be valuable in an objective natural 
historical sense.
Yet even Rolston, as a strong advocate of biodiversity conservation, argues 
that the “duty to species [not to cause their extinction] can be overridden, for 
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example with pests or disease organisms” (2001: 410). Thus, even if a mosquito 
species holds natural historical value, things do not look good for our mosqui-
toes. Moreover, the moral value of different species may be considered to be dif-
ferently morally weighty. In terms of natural historical value, one consideration 
might be that a lack of distinctiveness of a species implies that it is not as valuable 
as another, recognizing that there are more than 3,000 mosquito species with 
differing degrees of distinctness around the world. Because only a small num-
ber of these mosquito species actually transmits diseases to humans, the case for 
protecting them based on their moral value needs to be supplemented with other 
considerations in their favour.
Adding context
Of course, considering the value of mosquitoes as either individuals or as species 
is neither sufficient for reaching a moral judgement for their protection, nor is it 
the only route for constructing an argument that speaks against their eradication. 
So far, we have only considered what matters morally (that is, has moral standing 
or value), but these considerations have to feed into normative theories (such as 
theories that focus on rights, utility or moral character). In this chapter I cannot 
give justice to the range of aspects different normative theories can bring to 
the subject of mosquito eradication and, thus, I will limit myself to mentioning 
just a few considerations that stand out (the points three and four mentioned 
previously)—starting with virtue ethics.
Hubris
To many people, the concern about hubris is an intuitive criticism to visions 
of mosquito eradication. Environmental virtue ethics is the most obvious lens 
for understanding this concern, because it puts emphasis on a person’s moral 
character. In this context, the question that poses itself is whether eradicating 
entire species is compatible with being and acting as the kind of person that has 
internalized a range of different virtues (that is, excellent character traits). Of 
course, even here there is a large variety of theoretical accounts, all of which 
propose a range of environment-specific virtues such as humility or gratitude as 
central attitudes towards nature. What actions such theories justify depends, on 
the one side, on what they consider morally valuable, as discussed before, and on 
the other side on the content of the relevant virtues (Sandler 2016).
Context is very important for virtue ethics approaches. However, at f irst 
view at least, it seems that different environmental virtue ethics, including 
varieties that do not acknowledge the moral standing of individual mosquitoes, 
are at least sceptical of plans to eradicate several mosquito species. On the face of 
it, such plans appear hubristic by misrepresenting humanity’s appropriate role in 
nature in addition to being epistemically hubristic by overestimating humanity’s 
ability to control nature. That is problematic insofar as hubris is understood 
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as a vice, and insofar that such plans are incompatible with such virtues as 
humility in our actions and our stance toward the environment. Such concerns, 
of course, appear particularly pressing if one also presupposes a particular way 
of understanding humanity’s place in nature that rejects the role of a master or 
a manager.
In terms of hubris and humility such an endeavour to eradicate mosquitoes 
appears to share similarities with other controversial human interventions in 
nature, such as plans to address climate change through geoengineering (Meyer 
and Uhle 2015) or genetic crop modification through biotechnology (Sandler 
2004). Whether different accounts of environmental virtue ethics ultimately 
reject or justify such wide-ranging human interventions—including the 
eradication of disease-carrying mosquito species—involves taking into account 
all morally relevant contextual features, humanity’s health burden being one of 
such crucial concerns.
Risks
A person who is not convinced by virtue-based perspectives might, however, 
think differently about risk-based arguments and still be inclined to favour a 
precautionary approach in light of the risks involved in any such intervention (even 
if done for purely human-focused reasons) when weighted against its potential 
benefits. Much recent work about ethics and disease-carrying mosquitoes are 
written from a public heath perspective and highlight this specific question of 
risk—usually linked to the importance of community engagement mentioned 
earlier—in light of the current development of gene drives for containing 
mosquito-borne diseases (Greisman et al. 2019, Patrão Neves and Druml 2017, 
Resnik 2014, Resnik 2017).
Gene-drive systems, as technologies of genome editing, are developed, for 
example, as means for eradicating mosquito species or else creating resistances 
to pathogens (such as a virus) in a target population of mosquitoes. For instance, 
Jonathan Pugh (2016), who does not consider mosquitoes to be morally con-
siderable in themselves, does not find the “hubris objection” convincing while 
discussing gene-drive technologies potentially being used on disease-carrying 
mosquitoes as a means of eradication. Still, he argues that a better understanding 
of the potential effects and success of mosquito eradication will be important to 
make well-informed moral decisions. Indeed, Pugh is right when claiming that 
“epistemic humility” does not involve the dismissal of biotechnology based on 
it having some risk (Pugh 2016: 580). Yet, the potential irreversibility of gene 
drives, for example, is definitely a risk to take into account. Even by relying on 
solutions less technical than gene drives, the eradication of a species by more 
“conventional” means carries a risk for ecosystems and may be irreversible (when 
putting the controversial possibility of “de-extinction” with technological solu-
tions aside). Accordingly, one might still be inclined to favour the precautionary 
principle in light of the risks involved in any intervention—even ones carried 
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out for purely human-focused reasons—which are intertwined with a range of 
empirical questions.5
Self-defence
So far, we have seen several ethical considerations that can justify a reluctance in 
wanting to eradicate mosquitoes. This reluctance may be based on a mosquito’s 
moral standing, the natural historical value of a mosquito species, concerns about 
our own moral character or concerns about risk. In turn, these considerations 
will be part of a broader assessment of mosquito eradication proposals, most 
inclusively by providing a pluralistic picture that engages with different norma-
tive theories. Besides the virtue ethics approach mentioned above, one could ask 
questions about whether mosquitoes have certain rights that must be accounted 
for or whether certain strategies are better than others to maximize well-being. 
However, there is an additional dimension to dealing with mosquitoes not yet 
addressed. The question is what constitutes the appropriate problem-framing 
of the conf lict between humans and disease-carrying mosquitoes and can it be 
framed as a matter of self-defence?6
Humans stand in a multitude of different moral relationships with non-human 
animals, each of which comes with a different set of moral demands. For example, 
most mosquito species do not prey on humans, a fact which makes living alongside 
them on a shared planet possible as long as human impact on their habitats, say in 
the forms of soil degradation or air pollution, is contained.7 The case is different, 
however, for our relationship with those few mosquito species that “prey” on 
humans by having a preference for human blood. Yet, again only a subset of these 
anthropophilic mosquito species also carry malaria, dengue fever, Zika and so on.
At first glance, these cases of disease-carrying mosquitoes look like 
straightforward cases of self-defence which usually are considered morally 
permissible even if killing the aggressor is the only means to defend one’s own 
life. For instance, self-defence could be a way of justifying the extermination 
of the smallpox pathogen, which was declared accomplished in 1979 (WHO 
2019). Mosquitoes, like insects generally, have not featured prominently in 
the environmental ethics literature, but a self-defence framing stands out in 
this context. For instance, James Sterba has argued for a “Principle of Human 
Defense” which allows one to act against “harmful aggression” through harming 
and killing individual animals as well as whole species, when necessary (Sterba 
2005: 295). This would cover the disease-carrying mosquito case and allow for 
their eradication despite the fact that Sterba, as a biocentrist, is committed to 
attributing moral standing to each individual mosquito. By analogy, if someone 
innocent was attacked by a human aggressor with a knife, we would judge 
violent self-defence permissible, with the human aggressor remaining a person 
with moral standing (see also Taylor 1986).
Indeed, Sterba explicitly mentions that killing disease-carrying mosquitoes is 
a justifiable act of self-defence and states the following:
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In the case of human aggression, however, it is sometimes possible to effec-
tively defend oneself and other human beings by first suffering the aggres-
sion and then securing adequate compensation later. Because in the case 
of nonhuman aggression by the members of other species with which we 
are familiar, such an approach is unlikely to work, justifying more harm-
ful preventive actions such as killing a rabid dog or swatting a mosquito, 
potentially carrying disease. There are simply more ways to effectively stop 
aggressive humans than there are to effectively stop aggressive nonhumans.
(Sterba 1998: 364, italics added)
Sterba makes killing a mosquito, and in extension the eradication of a whole 
species, a bit more palatable by pointing out that in the case of mosquito “aggres-
sion” we do not have as many options of self-defence as we do with human 
conf licts. If someone vandalizes my house, I can demand compensation after the 
fact; but this is not the case for the mosquito who can place me in the hospital 
for months and neither can we “discuss” our differences in a conf lict-resolution 
scenario. Yet, this does not necessarily allow any kind of self-defending actions 
because the question remains whether there are methods for protecting human 
health that are less harmful to mosquitoes whilst being effective enough, as men-
tioned above. For instance, Jake Monaghan argues that while a biocentric posi-
tion allows for killing in self-defence, it demands “programs which make the 
mosquitoes malaria-resistant, if it is at all a possibility” (2018: 134). Of course, 
such programmes come with their own set of issues (particularly, when involving 
gene drives) that have to be taken into account. Moreover, for self-defence to be 
applicable, humans must apply “reasonable care” (Taylor 1986: 265) in avoid-
ing contact with disease-carrying mosquitoes. Given the wide global spread of 
mosquitoes and the common use of disease-control measures (such as bed nets or 
protective clothing) this condition seems to be met in many instances.
Nevertheless, there is still some background missing from the mosquito story, 
namely that the mosquito is merely instrumentalized by the disease that it car-
ries, the disease being the real “aggressor” from which we need self-defence. 
The real source of the problem is the microbe that produces malaria, dengue 
fever and Zika, with mosquitoes merely being the “vehicle” that transmits them. 
Accordingly, it is more apt to understand the disease-carrying mosquito as the 
“innocent” vector. The way we frame a problem determines what we identify as 
its morally relevant features and so the emphasis can be put on different aspects 
of the problem.
On the one hand, it can be seen as a clear case of (collective) self-defence 
where a large section of humanity justifiably tries to defend itself from an aggres-
sion against its health and lives. Excluding some forms of genetic modification 
(which would change the problem-framing), killing may be the only way to fend 
off such aggression if it comes from entities that are “innocent” in the sense of 
having no awareness of the consequences of their actions. The mosquito is not 
a moral agent. On the other hand, although all mosquitoes that feed on human 
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blood cause irritation, the dangerous “predator” that is targeted for eradication 
in this case is the disease (i.e. the virus or parasite) that they carry. So, one way 
of framing the issue would be to consider the eradication of the mosquitoes—
now “innocent” by not being the ultimate source of the harm—as problematic 
“collateral damage” of the eradication of the diseases in question. That would be 
closer to a case of killing a bystander or hostage which carries a bigger moral bur-
den. In a sense, the mosquito is “taken hostage” by the virus or the parasite that 
uses the mosquito’s body as a resource. If that is an appropriate representation of 
the problem at hand, then it deviates in certain respects from the straightforward 
case of self-defence.
This illustrates, for one, that there are different senses in which the mos-
quito may be portrayed as “innocent.” For instance, there is the unaware mos-
quito scenario and in that sense the mosquito constitutes an innocent threat. Yet, 
the mosquito also constitutes an innocent threat if it is instrumentalized by the 
virus which also does not constitute a moral agent. This is the hostage scenario, 
with an unaware virus. It follows that there are at least two ways in which the 
mosquito might constitute an innocent threat, and many might think that the 
second scenario intuitively requires more to be at stake to justify doing harm 
to the mosquito in fending off the disease. Although some might believe that 
self-defence against innocent threats is justified, others regard it as inappropri-
ate to be conceived as self-defence, since the threat is innocent.8 In that case, 
the problem would need to be framed as a matter of negative side-effects in the 
form of eradicating a species necessary for achieving the goal of a healthier world 
for people. That would mean that the human–mosquito conf lict could not be 
framed as a matter of defence.
It therefore matters if the envisaged mosquito “specicide” is the outcome of 
a genuine self-defence scenario, or whether the mosquitoes are just bearing the 
burden of humanity’s wish to make the Earth safer for itself, which includes a 
broad set of practices that affect the life and well-being of non-humans. Because 
there are alternatives to specicide when it comes to controlling mosquito-borne 
diseases, one must keep in mind that the eradication of the “innocent” mosquito 
cannot be disentangled from the broader web of potential moral failings. One 
needs to consider whether mosquito eradication proposals potentially constitute 
a means of obscuring other social and economic factors that can contribute to 
the prevalence of mosquito-borne diseases, such as the considerations of justice 
mentioned in the first section.9 For instance, a focus on mosquito eradication 
might obscure that there are pressing social justice concerns such as about neces-
sary access to health services that need to be addressed urgently. The swatting 
of a single mosquito that landed on my arm therefore needs to be distinguished 
from a practice of species eradication that is connected to a range of other moral 
and political decisions that depend on broader ethical considerations regarding 
humans and non-humans alike.
Of course, this discussion of “innocence” depends on the mosquito itself hav-
ing moral standing, as discussed previously. Such considerations mean that a 
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disease-carrying mosquito is not equivalent to a virus-infected computer, for 
example. Any perspective that denies moral standing to mosquitoes will perceive 
the mosquito problem as less complex than presented here. Beyond the question 
of “innocence,” another dimension of the mosquito problem considers the ques-
tion of how far this scenario constitutes a matter of self-defence.
So far, we have simply framed defence as a collective self-defence in which 
“humanity” defends itself. In practice, there are considerable regional differences 
that are in the process of transformation due to climate change, with not all 
regions and communities being equally affected by mosquito-borne diseases. 
Some regions and some individuals are not affected at all while others must deal 
with several mosquito-borne diseases at once. More accurately would then be 
to frame it as a matter of self-defence of certain affected communities, if that 
is the course of action that they choose to pursue. Or, it could be framed as a 
third-party defence, because in practice such large-scale eradication programmes 
are instigated by national and international organizations in aid for the affected 
communities. As such the defence of others would generate additional issues to 
take into consideration in comparison to a straightforward case of self-defence 
(for instance, is there a duty to defend the affected party and, if so, by whom?). 
This question of agency therefore links, in turn, to broader questions of global 
health justice, such as regarding potential duties to finance mosquito interventions 
and technology transfer and reintroduces challenges of political legitimacy and 
informed consent.10
The upshot
As we have seen, whether the eradication of a mosquito species can be considered 
morally defensible depends on a range of normative and empirical questions. I 
have outlined how some of these considerations can be brought in the mosquito’s 
favour. These may be based, inter alia, on the moral standing of individual 
mosquitoes, the moral value of a whole mosquito species, and concerns about 
hubris and risk.
Yet these considerations neither exhaust all that can be said from an 
environmental ethics perspective nor are they meant to deny the strong moral 
prerogative to reduce the health burden of mosquito-borne disease. That we 
have reached the point of even asking the question about whether mosquitoes 
should be eradicated, indicates that we must carefully consider its context to 
make sure that nothing of moral relevance is overlooked. For one, we need to ask 
whether, and in what form, the self-defence scenario is an appropriate problem-
framing. Next, we must consider whether there are any alternative means which 
might be all-things-considered morally preferable. If alternatives to eradication 
are viable—and since the eradication of disease-carrying mosquitoes may be 
impossible—then part of the debate should be about whether there are moral 
demands, such as in terms of global justice, to fund alternative efforts to reduce 
diseases carried by mosquitoes and other vectors. It would also be valuable to take 
 The innocent mosquito? 207
a step back to think about how the mosquito question is the product of moral 
failures that have perpetuated the global problem of mosquito-borne diseases. 
Such considerations lead us also to political questions, such as vested interests in 
different technologies, which will inf luence which set of options are available.
Even if our answer is ultimately affirmative—that we do need to eradicate 
certain mosquito species to the best of our abilities—doing so still requires 
awareness that something of moral value will be lost (e.g. in terms of the 
species) and that something of moral status has potentially been harmed (that is, 
individual mosquitoes). The upshot is that taking all these moral considerations 
seriously will leave us with an awareness that the eradication of these species 
cannot be taken lightly. Any environmental ethics theory that dismisses such a 
loss oversimplifies the complex and conf lictual moral decision-making at play, 
even when we have very good reasons to defend and protect our own health.
Notes
1 Of course, depending on how we define harm and the well-being of individual mos-
quitoes, it is not necessarily the case that all potential forms of eradication or control 
interventions would cause any harm to individuals. What constitutes harm to insects 
is an area of debate, but most generally, it seems that methods that kill adult mosqui-
toes are likely to involve harm to individuals while preventing them from coming to 
life in the first place does not.
2 But note that “ecosystem services” can also be understood more broadly, involving 
more than instrumental values only.
3 Most plausible to me, the non-instrumental moral value of species is not identical to 
the moral status of individuals as discussed in the last section (Sandler 2012), but that 
still leaves a range of options.
4 Non-instrumental value is often labelled as “intrinsic value” but for a nuanced 
differentiation between various uses of “intrinsic value” see O’Neill 1992.
5 Besides questions about which kinds of risk for humans (e.g. adverse ecological 
effects) and their likelihood we deem acceptable or not, gene-drive technology is 
also entangled in a host of other normative questions that I cannot do justice to here. 
See Preston and Wickson (2019) for a comprehensive overview. For instance, such 
technological interventions raise also questions about naturalness, the ontology of 
species and new responsibilities in light of changing relationships between humans 
and non-human beings. For example, accounts that consider “naturalness”—which is 
a contested concept (see Siipi 2008)—to confer a non-instrumental moral value might 
deem synthetic gene drives particularly problematic by introducing an “artificial” 
element into nature.
6 Ultimately, that is a matter of choice. Alternatives need to be considered and the 
appropriateness of the self-defence analogy can be challenged.
7 It has been argued that keeping environmental degradation to a minimum is even 
a matter of doing justice to non-human living beings. Yet, while the destruction of 
mosquito habitats is a matter of (distributive) justice, the conf lict between disease-
carrying mosquitoes and humans is not (Wienhues 2020).
8 For an overview of defence against animals see Kagan 2019. See also Monaghan 
(2018) for a biocentric argument that justifies self-defence against innocent threats.
9 Such concerns particularly apply to the employment of biotechnological means such 
as gene drives. See Preston and Wickson (2019).
10 An additional matter of third-party defence is the question of the affected domestic 
animals. Based on the idea that we are standing with domesticated animals in a 
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different relationship than with animals such as the mosquito (see Palmer 2010), it 
could be argued, for example, that the defence of domestic animals from mosquito-
borne diseases is necessitated by a duty of care for these animals (of course, while 
putting aside questions about the moral legitimacy of animal husbandry in the first 
place).
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